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to occur when larger dimensions of the market, L, push researchers to increase their efforts in
searching for process innovations; firstly, to avoid the decrease in the value of new patents which
otherwise would be generated by smaller profits due to the higher competition and, secondly, to
increase their purchasing power on a larger number of new more productive varieties.
We know that the no arbitrage condition between patents and a safe asset implies that the
following Fisher equation must be satisfied for every value of m
πm
vm
+
v˙m
vm
= r (22)
We recall that while for m 6= i innovation does not introduce any new varieties, these are
developed for the i− th group of firms.
4 Moving equilibrium
In this section we describe the properties of the equilibrium of the model, which will be character-
ized as a moving equilibrium, given that we assume that the number of firms is the slow variable
of the economy, while all other variables are the fast variables.5
In particular, we know from expression (11) that in equilibrium the labor market is clearing.
From (10), (6) and (17) we obtain that employment in the final sector is
LC =
α
w
=
αa
vini
(23)
Thus, in any periods between the two subsequent reduction in γi, the market clearing condition
(11) can be rewritten as
L =
n˙i
ni
a+
αa
vini
Let us denote with Vi the inverse of the value of the aggregate existing stock of patents of firms
of type i, Vi = 1vini . Then, from the previous equation, we derive the growth rate of firms of type
5 See Schlicht (1985, 1997).
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i in any periods between the two subsequent reduction in γi, that is
gi =
L
a
− αVi (24)
where gi = n˙i/ni.
For any time before a subsequent reduction in γi, we know from expressions (22) and (23) that
the rate of change of Vi for firms of type i is
V˙i
Vi
= Vi
ni(1− α)
iX
j=1
nj
³
γi
γj
´σ−1 − gi − r (25)
From the previous expression, we note that we have Grossman and Helpman’s (1991) results only
if γi = γj ∀j = 1, ...., i−1, because this would also imply that ni = nj ∀j = 1, ...., i−1. Moreover,
in the same particular case, we know that the interception between the two curves (24) and (25)
would be unique when V˙i = 0, as is required in equilibrium.
However, when, as it happens in our case, γi 6= γj , the intersection between the two curves
(24) and (25) is not unique and it moves over time as ni increases in any period between two
following values of γi are made available. Therefore, more than a fixed steady state equilibrium,
as in Grossman and Helpman (1991), our assumptions lead to identify a moving equilibrium, which
is characterized by continuous changes in the number of firms with different productivities.
Let us define the index bi as
bi ≡
niγ
1−σ
i
iX
j=1
njγ
1−σ
j
(26)
It is readily verifiable that 0 ≤ bi ≤ 1 and that bi approaches 1 when ni goes to infinity. bi
gives us some information on the relative weight of firms of type i on the total number of firms,
where the weights are given by the productivity measure γ1−σi . Hence, given that the value of bi
continuously changes, we have a moving equilibrium characterized by continuous changes in the
fast variables due to movements in the slow variable bi. Particularly, we have a moving equilibrium
when all variables assume their equilibrium values conditioned to the number of patents already
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introduced in the R&D sector or, in an equivalent fashion, conditioned to the value of bi, which
depends on the number of patents. Then, changes in the number of available varieties, change bi
and, consequently, other variables, as we show in the rest of this section. Expressions (24), (25)
and (5) tell us that for any of those moving equilibria the following condition must be satisfied
V˙i = Vi


Vi


(1− α) niγ
1−σ
i
iX
j=1
njγ
1−σ
j
+ α


− L
a
− ρ


(27)
Moreover, we use (26) to rewrite profits (8) in the following way
πm =
(1− α)
nm
bm < 1 (28)
Substituting (26), (6) and (17) into (3), we obtain that the demand for any firm of type m is
xm =
nmp
1−σ
m
nmpm
iX
j=1
njp
1−σ
j
=
aαbm
nmγm
Vi (29)
Using this expression we derive the total demand xmnm for all firms of type m, that is
nmxm =
aαbm
γm
Vi (30)
Expression (30) tells us that when new more productive varieties are made available by the inno-
vative sector, as the innovative process goes on, the total demand xmnm for the oldest firms of
type m, characterized by the highest values of γ, tends to decrease to zero, because bm becomes
smaller and smaller. On the contrary, the total demand xini for firms of type i on the technological
frontier, tends to increase as bi increases.
Substituting (26), expression (27) becomes
V˙i = Vi
½
Vi [(1− α)bi + α]−
L
a
− ρ
¾
(31)
Expression (31) is an upward opening parabola, with V˙i = 0 either when Vi = 0 or when V ∗i =
L/a+ρ
(1−α)bi+α > 0. The graph is plotted in Figure 1 only for positive values of Vi, because negative
values of Vi would have no meaning.
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Insert Figure 1 about here
Moreover, in Figure 1 we also plot the actual value of Vi derived from (23), that is
Vi =
LC
αa
(32)
We know from (32) that (11) and (25) are, respectively,
LR = L− LC (33)
and
V˙i =
µ
LC
αa
¶·
biLC
αa
(1− α)−
µ
LR
a
+ ρ
¶¸
(34)
Hence, as both pairs of equations above (31)-(32) and (33)-(34) show, the equilibrium outcomes
which we describe within this framework are not stationary, given that bi changes as the innovating
process goes on determining the introduction of new varieties which increase ni. Thus, between
any pair of subsequent process innovations which lead to changes in γi, the equilibria we consider
are moving equilibria which we need, indeed, to identify.6
We notice that we need to know LC (or LR) in order to define the exact position of the vertical
line (32) in Figure 1, otherwise, we could either have that LC/(αa) < V ∗i or that LC/(αa) > V
∗
i .
These two options would imply opposite changes in Vi. In fact, while Vi is increasing when
Vi > V
∗
i , it is decreasing when Vi < V
∗
i . However, as we show in two steps, Vi must be equal to
6 In other words, we can consider the economy as described by the following equation system in two vectors of
variables x and y:
x˙ = f (x, y) and y˙ = g (x, y)
where the vector of fast variable is x0 = (pm, xm, vm, Vm, w, πR, LR, LC , gi) and the vector of slow variable is
y0 = (bi). Note that the slow variable bi is obtained as a transformation of the number of all variables, nm with
m = 1, 2, ......, i, which, thus, are considered as slow variables too.
In the paper we assume that the fast vector has already reached its equilibrium for any given and fixed value
of the slow variable, bi, and we prove that the equilibrium is univocally identified for any given value of bi in the
following paragraphs in the text of the paper when we show that Vi = V ∗i =
L/a+ρ
(1−α)bi+α
.
Particularly, the equilibrium value of the fast vector x is
x = X (bi), with f (X (bi) , bi) = 0.
Then, given that the slow variable bi changes over time, then x = X (bi) gives the corresponding moving
equilibrium of x. (See Schlicht (1985, 1997))
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V ∗i . In particular, first we recall that this is true in Grossman and Helpman’s (1991, ch. 3) case.
Then we prove that this is true in our general case.
First of all, we recall that if we were in Grossman and Helpman’s (1991, ch. 3) case, γ
would assume only one value, that is γm = γi = γ1 ∀m. Moreover, in this case the steady state
equilibrium is characterized by V˙1 = 0 and LR = L (1− α) − aαρ. In fact, we know that in this
case the expectations of agents are fulfilled only if the economy jumps immediately to the point
in which V˙1 = 0, because if V˙1 were positive we would have V1 growing to infinity, while if V˙1
were negative, we would end up with V1 = 0. However, Grossman and Helpman (1991) show
that both cases are impossible, given that: in the first case we cannot have V1 growing to infinity
because LR would be drawn to zero, n1 would stop growing, and v1 would be different from zero
(given that with a finite number of variety, profits are strictly positive); in the second case, we
cannot have V1 = 0, because LR would assume its maximum potential value, L, with LC = 0, and
expectations would be contradicted.7 Finally, we notice that in this case, b1 = 1. If we consider
the pair of equations (31)-(32) which describes the equilibrium condition, they would intersect in
V1 =
L−LR
αa = V
∗
1 = L/a+ ρ with LR = L (1− α)−aαρ derived from the second pair of equations
(33)-(34).
Let us now consider the case in which, in the framework so far described, an innovation process
takes place producing new patents characterized by γ2 < γ1, which perturbs previous stationary
equilibrium.8 These new patents allow n2 firms to employ the technology of type 2. We know
from (21) that n2 = 1an1LR and that b2 =
n2γ1−σ2
n1γ1−σ1 +n2γ
1−σ
2
< 1.
7 In fact, Grossman and Helpman (1991, p. 61) recall that if LR = L, the number of varieties would grow
continuously and, at the same time we would have v1(t) =
∞?
t
e−r(τ−t) 1−αn1(t)
dτ < 1−αrn1(t)
.
In fact, v1(t) =
∞?
t
e−r(τ−t) 1−αn1(t)
dτ =
?
− e
−r(τ−t)
r
?∞
t
1−α
n1(t)
=
?
− e
−r∞
r +
1
r
?
1−α
n1(t)
< 1−αrn1(t)
.
Therefore, we would have that v1(t)n1 (t) < 1−αr which is equivalent to saying V1(t) >
r
1−α > 0 which contradicts
the fact that V1 = 0.
8 In the particular example described by (20) when n1L = χ1. In any case, we recall that we do not need to use
this particular specification of the more general expression (19).
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After the change in γ, the innovative sector continues to produce new patents of type 2 ac-
cording to (12). The inverse of the aggregate value of patents of type 1 is equal to V1 = 1v1n1 ,
where n1 is now a constant. Moreover, from (28), we know that profits of firms of type 1 are from
now on π1 =
(1−α)
n1 b1. At the same time, there will be continuous increases in n2, or in other more
productive types of firms whenever there are further innovations leading to further reductions in
γ. These processes will reduce b1, reducing profits of firms of type 1 and, therefore, the value of
patents of firms of type 1, v1, thereby, increasing V1. Therefore, we know that V1 is increasing in
b1. Moreover, for any given value of b1, n1 and v1 are given and, thus, V1 is univocally determined.
In other words, we are able to rule out bubble paths for the aggregate value of firms which are
no longer on the technological frontier, such as firms of type 1, once technology with γ2 can be
used. Furthermore, we may say that this is generally true for any firms of type m different from
i, that is, firms at the technological frontier from the production process point of view, because
their number nm does not increase anymore, and because their value vm must decrease due to the
ongoing growth in variety. At the limit, when the weight bm of firms adopting older technology
than the firms at the frontier, γi tends to decrease toward zero, and Vm tends to infinity.
Lemma 1 For any variety which is not at the technological frontier, that is, for any variety
produced with γm > γi, profits decrease and Vm increases as the weight bm of the group decreases
as a consequence of subsequent innovations in the R&D sector which increase the number of
patents.
Moreover, returning to our example, we further observe that once the new patents of type 2
become available at the technological frontier, with i = 2, and b2 < 1, then V ∗2 =
L/a+ρ
(1−α)b2+α > V
∗
1 .
Then we notice that while firms of type 2 remain at the frontier, for a given value of b2 , if
V2 =
1
v2n2 does not immediately jump to V
∗
2 , there could be two other possible cases which we
should consider: either we have V2 < V ∗2 (with V˙2 < 0 which would draw V2 to zero), or V2 > V
∗
2
(with V˙2 > 0 and V2 growing to infinity). We note, in passing, that the following arguments can
be generalized to the case in which firms of type i are at the frontier, for given bi values.
We rule out the first case, that is V2 < V ∗2 , because we want to exclude asset bubble paths
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both in the subcase in which all firms of type 2 will always continue to be on the technological
frontier in the future and in the subcase in which, sometime in the future, these firms will no
longer be on the technological frontier due to further process innovations, which further reduce
γ for future varieties. In the first subcase, V2 cannot be drawn to zero because this would be
possible, for a finite number of firms n2, only with v2 increasing to infinity; but with ongoing
patent innovations this is impossible. Following the same reasoning, we can exclude asset bubble
paths in the present (while firms of type 2 are at the frontier) also in the subcase in which the
same firms were no longer supposed to be on the technological frontier at sometime in the future.
In fact, if in the future the number of varieties is growing, we can exclude a continuous growth in
v2 and consequent decreases in V2 in the present, for given value of n2 and b2, because profits of
firms of type 2 are superiorly limited by variety growth.
We can also rule out the second case, that is V2 > V ∗2 , once more both in the subcase in which
all firms of type 2 will always continue to be on the technological frontier in the future and in the
subcase in which, at sometime in the future, these firms will no longer be on the technological
frontier due to further process innovations. In the first subcase, when firms of type 2 remain on
the frontier with i = 2, this will rapidly lead to employ all workers in the manufacturing sector
with no more growth in variety (given that we know from (32) that V2 = LCαa ) and V2 increasing
to infinity. However, this would be possible only if v2 were equal to zero and we exclude this case
because if the number of varieties stops growing, profits must always be strictly positive. Finally,
in the second subcase if n2 stops growing at sometime in the future because firms of type 2 are
displaced from the frontier, in the present (while these firms are at the frontier), we know that V2
will increase to infinity in the future, because it is in the future that v2 tends to zero as b2 (and
profits) tends to zero. However, these future increases in V2 cannot be anticipated in the present,
because, otherwise, V2 would be lead to infinity in the present which would be inconsistent with
LC < L. In other words, from (32) we could have it only with LC = L, but at the expense of
no innovation at all in the present (because LR = 0) which would exclude the potential future
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process innovations.
So we have that when firms of type two are at the technological frontier, V2 immediately jumps
to V ∗2 and that, for any given value of b2, V˙2 = 0. We know that b2 changes in the present with
ongoing patent innovations. In particular, it continuously increases, because n2 increases. As long
as firms of type two are at the technological frontier, the continuous increase in b2 is associated
with continuous reductions in V2 = V ∗2 , with V2 having a lower limit. In fact, V2 = V
∗
2 tends to
V ∗1 as n2 increases.
We already noticed that previous arguments can be generalized to the case in which, instead
of firms of type 2 we considers firms of type i at the frontier for given bi values. For we know now
that we have
Vi = V
∗
i =
L/a+ ρ
(1− α)bi + α
(35)
where Vi = V ∗i is increasing in L, ρ (with ρ = r) and decreasing in a, bi and α.
We may write the following lemma:
Lemma 2 In general, the inverse of the aggregate value of firms at the frontier, Vi, is Vi = V ∗i >
V ∗1 with V˙i = 0 when bi is given. However, given that bi increases when patent innovations take
place for firms at the technological frontier increasing ni, Vi changes approaching V ∗1 as the weight
bi increases.
The previous lemma is extremely important given that it allows us to identify not a unique
steady state equilibrium, but a series of moving equilibria, which can be considered as perturba-
tions of the original steady state equilibrium in Grossman and Helpman (1991, ch. 3), and which
continue to change as long as bi changes and as long as we can have different process innovations
which continue to change the technology at the frontier. The implications of our results will be
discussed in the following section.
Moreover, from expressions (30) and (35) we obtain the total demand for varieties of type i
xini =
aα
γi
·
L/a+ ρ
(1− α) + α/bi
¸
which clearly shows that as bi increases, total demand for varieties of type i increases. Thus,
gradually in our model, while the market share and the demand of previously developed varieties
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decreases, the market share and the demand of new and more productive varieties made available
increases as long as they are on the technological frontier.
5 Structural changes and the scale effect
One of the most striking characteristics of the moving equilibrium we have so far described is that
it allows us to represent the effects of ongoing patent innovations which take place together with
process innovations. Considering both kinds of innovations gives a more complete picture of the
effects of R&D activities and it produces a setup in which the rate of growth of patent innovations
varies across time according to workers’ distribution between the final and the innovative sectors
considered in the model.
In the period in which technology of type i is available, we know from expression (12) that the
rate of innovation is proportional to the number of workers employed in the R&D sector, and this
number LR, derived from (33)-(34) when V˙i = 0, depends on the value of bi, that is
LR =
Lbi (1− α)− aρα
(1− α) bi + α
(36)
As in Grossman and Helpman (1991), we assume that L is sufficiently large to allow patent
innovations to take place: this requires that L > aρα/bi (1− α). Once more, it is readily verifiable
that when bi = 1 we obtain the same results as in Grossman and Helpman (1991).
Expression (36) shows that the number of workers employed in the innovative sector is an
increasing function of bi because
∂LR
∂bi
=
(1− α)α (L+ aρ)
((1− α) bi + α)2
> 0
Therefore, when there are at least two different types of firms producing using different technolo-
gies, and the innovative sector intensifies its research in finding new patents for the production
of new goods employing the more productive technologies, then any time a new patent is pro-
duced and implemented the value of bi increases. As bi increases, the final sector in aggregate
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